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INTRASTATE SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT
DANIEL J. MCCAuLEY, JR. t
The exemption which the federal securities legislation provides for intrastate
offerings is a narrow on, surrounded by complexities likely to entrap the
intrastate issuer and his attoney in unsuspected violations. This article,
one of iny to be published in various law journals during the ensuing year
by mnembers of the Connmission and its staff to mark the silver anniversary
of the Commission's activities, alerts the reader to these problems by
exploring the elements of the exemption and reviewing the legislative context,
history and recent proposals. The author then discusses the applicability
of the fraud and civil liability provisions of the Securities Act to intrastate
transactims and the implications of the parallel state securities regulatiol.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, in the administration
of the several acts over which it has assumed full jurisdiction,1 often
parallels in function the authority and responsibility of various state
commissions and administrators, as well as other federal independent
regulatory agencies. This is particularly so under the Securities Act
of 1933, which gives rise to problems with respect to intrastate offer-
ings of securities, problems which it is the purpose of this article to
explore. It is a misconception common among a great many issuers
of securities and among attorneys who have had only a limited
t Member of Pennsylvania Bar. B.S., 1938, La Salle College; LL.B., 1941,
University of Pennsylvania Law School. Associate General Counsel, Securities &
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New York Bar and staff of the General Counsel's Office of the Commission, and of
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The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims
responsibility for any private publication by any of its employees. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
1. E.g., the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78jj (1952) (hereinafter referred to as the Exchange Act) ; the Securities Act
of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1952) (hereinafter referred
to as the Securities Act). Furthermore, the Commission administers the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6
(1952) ; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1952); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-52 (1950); and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 54 Stat 847, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (1952). The Commission
also performs an advisory function under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52
Stat. 883 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1952).
2. Considerable overlap of functions has also been involved in the Commission's
administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, supra note 1.
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exposure, if any, to the Federal Securities Laws to assume that if
securities are distributed intrastate there need be no concern whatsoever
with the Commission and the Securities Act which it administers.
Nothing could be further from the truth. As will be developed more
fully, the intrastate issuer and his attorney must be aware constantly
of the narrow exemption channel through which the issuer is drifting
and must safeguard continuously against possible violation of the
federal law, with all its attendant consequences and sanctions. These
difficulties may not be perceptible to the unwitting adventurer into the
intricate and complicated Securities Act itself. The venture becomes
even more risky to him if he finds himself entangled in any of the many
diverse, complex factual situations under corporate law which neces-
sitate "administrative interpretation," particularly if he fails to take
active advantage of this saving device.
In the economic complex of today's capital markets, there are still
many issuers of securities whose financial requirements are of modest
proportions and who are desirous of raising venture capital within a
reasonably small geographical area. Legitimate small business with
such needs and motivations properly may question the necessity of
entanglement with the federal law. On the other hand, some, often
motivated by less legitimate purposes, may seek to utilize the intrastate
exemption for the purpose of evading requirements of disclosure under
the Securities Act.4 It is probably safe to conclude that in this, as well
as in other areas, it is the unsavory tactics of the few which obtain
more publicity than the proper activities of the many. Be that as it
may, concern has developed in some circles with the result that legis-
lators and others have raised as an issue the propriety of exempting
intrastate securities transact-ions from the Securities Act: The leading
congressional proponent of federal regulation of all securities trans-
actions, Congressman Abraham Multer of New York, recently has
been joined publicly in this view by J. Sinclair Armstrong, a former
Chairman of the SEC.'
3. Since its inception the SEC has, as a service to industry and the bar, made
available interpretive advice on complex or novel questions. To the newcomer the
extent of the service may not be known, but to those who are active in the securities
field this service is well known and frequently sought. Each of the Commission's
three operational divisions as well as its seventeen regional and branch offices partici-
pate in this service. In addition the office of the General Counsel may be consulted.
In unusual cases or those of first impression the Commission itself considers the
interpretive problem. For a more detailed discussion see: Meeker, SEC Legal As-
sistance Available to the Genwral Practitioner, Prac. Law., Oct. 1957, p. 42.
4. "The essential purpose of the [Securities Act] is to protect investors by requir-
ing publication of certain information concerning securities before offered for sale."
A. C. Frost v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941).
5. Congressman Multer's legislative proposal and Mr. Armstrong's views are
discussed at text accompanying notes 57-64 infra.
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When such questions arise, it is appropriate to reappraise the
situation and to take stock of the values on both sides of the argument.
The present discussion will -include a review of the legislative history
of the intrastate exemption; an analysis of the statutory language;
registration problems; recent statutory recommendations; the impact
of the anti-fraud and civil liability sections of the federal law upon
intrastate issuers; and a short discussion of state regulation of secu-
rities transactions.
LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Originally, section 5 (c) of the Securities Act provided an exemp-
tion for securities sold by issuers within a single state by use of the
mails.' About a year later the intrastate exemption was removed and
incorporated into the exemptions set forth in section 3 (a) as paragraph
(11) ' where it has remained until the present time. The only change
which has been made in the statutory language occurred in 1954 when
the exemption limitations were made applicable to offers as well as to
sale of securities." Section 3(a) (11) now exempts from the registra-
tion and prospectus requirements of the act:
"Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold
only to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where
the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing business
within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business
within, such State or Territory." o
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this exemption is a
limited one which applies only with respect to the registration require-
ments provided in section 5 of the Securities Act.' The introductory
6. "The provisions of this section [§ 5] relating to the use of the mails shall not
apply to the sale of any security where the issue of which it is a part is sold only to
persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such securities
is a person resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by
and doing business within, such State or Territory." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38,
§5(c), 48 Stat. 77.
7. 48 Stat. 906 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (Supp. V, 1958).
8. 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a) (11) (Supp. V, 1958).
9. 48 Stat. 906 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (Supp. V, 1958).
(Emphasis added.) Only the words "offered and" were added.
10. 48 Stat 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (Supp. V, 1958). In essence this
section makes unlawful (1) any sale or delivery of any security unless a registration
statement has been made effective by the Commnission, and (2) any offer to sell or
offer to buy any security unless a registration statement has been filed with the Com-
mission.
Commission views with respect to some of the types of information which may
or may not be published by an issuer prior to the effective date of a registration state-
ment are stated in SEC Securities Act Release No. 3844 (October 8, 1957). See
also SEC v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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clause in section 3 puts the careful practitioner on notice that the
exemptions from the subchapter set forth in section 3(a) may be
subject to other sections of the act.'1 Section 17(c) specifically brings
within its provisions any securities which have been sold in violation of
its anti-fraud provisions even though the securities are otherwise
exempted by section 3 from registration under the act. 2 In addition,
section 12(2), one of the civil liability provisions of the act, applies
to all securities, including those exempt under section 3, except so-called
governments and municipals.' And section 18 of the Securities Act
must also be considered in discussing the legislative context of the
intrastate exemption, 4 for in this section Congress expressly declared
that the intervention of the federal government into securities regula-
tion was not to be construed as a pre-emption of the field since the power
and authority of the states to regulate securities and transactions in
securities were specifically reserved.'a
The original congressional intent with respect to the intrastate
exemption was that it exempt only "sales within a state of the entire
issues of local issuers." 1' One of the principal stated purposes of the
Securities Act was to make state control "more effective by preventing
evasion of state security legislation by the device of selling in interstate
or foreign commerce from outside the state"; "- in fact, the original
House bill '8 contained a provision which would have made this legisla-
11. Section 3(a) states as a preamble to the specific exemptions therein set forth:
"Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of the subehapter shall not
apply to any of the following classes of securities. . . ." See notes 12, 13 and 66
infra, and discussion in text accompanying notes 65-81 infra.
12. 48 Stat 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1952). Discussion of litigation wherein
the Commission has charged fraud with respect to intrastate offerings appears at text
accompanying notes 65-81 infra.
13. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (Supp. V, 1958).
14. 48 Stat 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1952). The section provides: "Nothing in
this subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities connission (or any
agency or office performing like functions) of any State or Territory of the United
States, or the District of Columbia, over any security or any person."
15. Since the Securities Act is a disclosure statute, the Commission avoids any
decision with respect to the merits of the securities being offered. This is not the case
in most states where qualification of a security may be refused for any of several
reasons. As an example, the amount of commission being paid to the underwriter
or members of the selling group is one of the most important considerations in
qualifying a security for sale in the several states. For a full discussion of the
standards applied by state administrators see Loss & Cowmrr, BLUE SKY LAw 67-79
(1958).
16. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933).
17. Id. at 10. As to this evasion the Report states: "The wisdom of such an
exertion of congressional power bases itself upon the uncontested fact that dealers
in securities have cleverly organized their means of distributing securities so as to
evade State blue-sky legislation by never entering the State. Such a policy does not
interfere with legitimate business, but only by resort to such a policy can interstate
commerce be closed to illegitimate business." Id. at 11.
18. H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
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tion even more directly supportive of state legislation by prohibiting
the sale of securities in interstate commerce within a state "where such
sale would have been a violation of the laws [of the State] . . . if it
had taken place wholly therein." 9 There was a strong minority
report criticizing this provision because it (a) gave each state arbitrary
control of the interstate sale of securities within its boundaries; (b)
removed the federal government from its traditional function as arbiter
between states in regulating interstate commerce; and (c) made the
federal government responsible for enforcement of the various state
laws.' Apparently as a result of these criticisms, the provision was
deleted.
Insofar as congressional intent is concerned, it is clear that the
following conclusions may be drawn from the legislative history of the
intrastate exemption:
1. Federal securities legislation was enacted, among other reasons,
to supplement state regulation by closing the door to interstate trans-
actions as to which state regulation was being frustrated;
2. Federal pre-emption of the field was not intended;
3. The intrastate exemption would be available for the securities
issues of local issuers only; and
4. An intrastate distribution of securities, although exempt from
the registration provisions would nevertheless be subject to its civil
liability and anti-fraud provisions.
THE ELEMENTS OF THE INTRASTATE EXEMPTION
Difficult interpretive questions and problems arise under section
3(a) (11) because of the several requirements which must be met to
assure compliance with the conditions of the intrastate exemption. It
is not our purpose to endeavor here to settle all of these questions.
Rather it is to emphasize the types of problems which confront issuers
when they choose not to register their securities but rather to rely upon
the intrastate exemption. The following is a breakdown and discussion
of the factors which make up the exemption.
19. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933). See also: I-LR Rn'.
No. 85, supra note 16, at 17.
20. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 16, at 27. The minority characterized the pro-
vision as injecting a "destructive principle" and said it was a "vexatious" and "burden-
some" handicap in administration of the proposed federal securities legislation.
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1. Any Security Which Is Part of an Issue
(a) Any Security
Of course it is not within the scope of this article to discuss the
breadth of meaning which has been given to the word "security." There
has been much litigation as to whether or not a particular specie of such
"intricate merchandise" 21 which is being sold to the public falls within
the statutory definition.' Aside from obvious, conventional instru-
ments such as stocks, bonds, notes and debentures, the courts have held
many varying contractual arrangements securities which, to the casual
observer, might not appear to be securities. These investment contract
arrangements run the gamut from cemetery lots to oyster bottom
acreage and from rabbits and silver foxes to whisky bottling and sales
contracts.2 Recently, the variable annuity was held to be an equity
21. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 16, at 8: "The rank and file of securities buyers
who have hitherto bought blindly should be made aware that securities are intricate
merchandise." For a discussion of the accomplishments of the act in effecting this
purpose see McCoRmICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SEcumRIs Acr AND THE S.E.C. 300-
05 (1948).
22. The term "security" is defined in §2(1) of the act, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15
U.S.C. 77b(1) (1952), as "any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."
23. The leading cases are SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), which
involved the sale and subsequent management of a portion of an orchard, and SEC
v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), wherein oil leasehold interests
were sold coupled with representations that the vendor would prove the productivity
of the land by drilling an exploration well. Other instances of such contracts are
referred to in the Joiner case, 320 U.S. at 352 n.10, as follows: "One's cemetery lot
is not ordinarily thought of as an investment and is most certainly real estate. But
when such interests become the subjects of speculation in connection with the cemetery
enterprise, courts have held conveyances of these lots to be securities. Matter of
Waldstein, 160 Misc. 763, 291 N.Y.S. 697; Holloway v. Thompson, 42 N.E. 2d 421
(Ind. App.). For other instances where purported sales of property have been held
'investment contracts' see Securities & Exchange Coinnn. v. Crude Oil Corp., 93 F.2d
844 (interest in oil royalties sold as bill of sale for specified number of barrels of oil) ;
Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Tung Corporation, 32 F. Supp. 371; Securities
& Exclange Comnn v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (land bearing tung trees, to be
developed by seller); Securities & Exchange Conzmn n v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873
(silver foxes); Prohaska v. Heimer-Miller Development Co., 256 Ill. App. 331
(farm land, to be paid for with proceeds of crops raised by vendor) ; Kerst v. Nelson,
171 Minn. 191, 213 N.W. 904 (land to be cultivated as a vineyard by a third party) ;
Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193 (rabbits)." To these
may be added Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 768 (1944) (whiskey bottling and sales contract) ; Ascher v. United States, 143
F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1944) (popcorn vending machines) ; United States v. Carter & Co.,
56 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Ky. 1944) (whiskey bottling and sales contract); SEC v.
Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (whiskey bottling and sales
contract) ; SEC v. Payne, 33 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1940) and 39 F. Supp. 434
CD. Mass. 1941) (shares in fishing boat) ; United States v. Brough, Civil No. 13707,
W.D. Okla., July 8, 1941 (pecan orchids); SEC. v. Cultivated Oyster Farms Corp.,
1 S.E.C. Judicial Decisions 1934-1939 672 (S.D. Fla. 1939) (oyster bottom acreage);
State v. Robbins, 185 Minn. 202, 240 N.W. 456 (1932) (muskrats).
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interest in a portfolio of securities although it was clothed in the trap-
pings of an insurance policy.
2 4
(b) Part of an Issue
Neither the Securities Act nor any of the rules adopted thereunder
define either an "issue!' or "part of an issue" as the term appears in the
intrastate exemption. However, it was held in Shaw v. United States,2"
that the meaning of "issue," as used in section 3(a) (11), was not to
be equated with the meaning of "issue" under the law of a particular
state. In the Shaw case it was contended that each sale or exchange
of originally issued shares of a common character was a separate issue
within the meaning of section 3(a) (11). The court rejected this
contention. In so doing, it defined an "issue" as "all the shares of
common character originally though successively issued by the cor-
poration." 2" It seems clear that the court's definition goes far beyond
the point necessary to reject the extremely narrow interpretation
urged by the accused. Obviously, it would frustrate the registration
provisions of the Securities Act if each individual sale of a security
of a "common character" constituted an "issue." On the other hand,
it has been pointed out that to interpret "issue" to mean all of the issued
shares of a common character; even though successively issued, has the
effect of making "issue" synonymous with "class." I Were this latter
interpretation to be adopted, any interstate sale, however remote in
time, would thereafter preclude forever the use of the intrastate
exemption in the sale of securities of the same class by an issuer. This
would burden both large and small companies, but particularly
the latter." In fact, the construction by the Shaw court, as a practical
matter, leaves little or no meaning to the words "part of an issue,"
which appear in section 3 (a) (11).
24. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 79 S. Ct. 618 (1959). See comment
on district court decision in 106 U. PA. L. REv. 483 (1958).
25. 131 F2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1942). This was a criminal prosecution for the
sale of unregistered securities.
26. 131 F.2d at 480.
27. Loss, SECuRrnEs REGULATION 365 n.212 (1951).
28. An issuer might have sold some of its securities in the past to an out-of-state
investor pursuant to the private offering exemption (§4(1), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15
U.S.C. § 77d(1) (Supp. V, 1958)) so that registration of the securities was unneces-
sary. It would be a burden on the issuer thereafter to take the position that the proper
use of one statutory exemption necessarily precludes the use of an entirely different
exemption with respect to securities of the same class. This, of course, is only if
the transactions are not integrated. See text accompanying notes 28-32 infra. How-
ever, the literal interpretation of the Shaw case would appear to impel this conclusion.
However, this is so only if the transactions are integrated.
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Integration of Sales of Securities
What constitutes an issue or a part of an issue of securities within
the statutory language of the intrastate exemption, is closely related to
the problem of "integration," the colloquial expression used by the
industry and the Commission in discussing certain registration prob-
lems. For want of more precise definition, "integration" may be
conceived as that relationship between separate offers and sales of
securities by an issuer which is such as to constitute a single related or
continuous distribution of such securities. Essentially a section 5 prob-
lem, integration may sometimes affect areas not related to the intrastate
exemption; for example, in a particular case, it may relate to whether
the regulation A exemption under section 3(b) is available to an
issuer.
2 9
Integration questions do not depend solely upon the class of
securities being distributed, although certainly this is a factor to be
considered." In determining whether integration is warranted, the
Commission considers the following factors: (1) are the offerings part
of a single plan of financing, (2) do the offerings involve issuance of the
same class of securities, (3) are the offerings made at or about the
same time, (4) is the same type of consideration to be received, and
(5) are the offerings made -for the same general purpose. If one or
more of these factors is not present, all of the surrounding circumstances
must be considered in order to evaluate what weight or importance
should be given to the factors which are present.3
One example of an integrated distribution which the Commission
recently noticed publicly is the Crowell-Collier financing of 1955 and
1956. In that instance, $3,000,000 of convertible debentures were sold
in 1955 and an additional $1,000,000 of convertible debentures were
sold at a premium at three separate 1956 settlements. All of the de-
bentures were covered by the same trust indenture. The premium
price charged in 1956 was related to the market price of the common
stock into which the debentures were convertible. Even though the
sales were a year apart, unquestionably the distribution was integrated3 2
If it is determined, on the basis of the aforementioned factors, that
intrastate offers and sales of securities are so related to interstate offers
29. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
30. For this reason the Commission does not follow the literal language of Shaw
v. United States, Pupra note 24.
31. See Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 625 (1938).
32. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1947) which stated: "It
has been and is the Commission's position that an issuer or an underwriter may not
separate parts of a series of related transactions comprising an issue of securities and
thereby seek to establish that a particular part is a private transaction if the whole
involves a public offering of the securities."
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and sales as to be integrated, those intrastate transactions to which
section 3 (a) (11) would otherwise have applied will not be exempt.
Typical of the many situations in which the problem may arise are: (1)
mergers and consolidations, (2) reissuance of treasury stock, (3)
pre-organization subscriptions as distinguished from the underlying
securities they represent, (4) securities offered by affiliated corpora-
tions, (5) private reorganizations of corporations, and (6) unit offer-
ings of different securities. In view of the many factors which must
be considered in such cases, the availability of the intrastate exemption
must be determined on the facts of each particular case.
Related directly to "integration" is the problem resulting from
the issuance of securities to corporate promoters. It is not uncommon
for out-of-state promoters to form a corporation and to take down a
bloc of stock for either services, property or cash. Thereafter, the
corporation may decide to sell its own stock intrastate. If the question
is approached by evaluating the "integration factors," it is likely that
in many cases the result would be that there is no integration and that
the intrastate public sale is proper under section 3(a) (11). If an
offering to promoters of the same class of securities is at a different
price, at a different (usually prior) time, and for a different purpose
than the public offering, integration is questionable. On the other
hand, offerings to out-of-state promoters, at or about the same time as
the public offering, presents a different situation, and may be integrated
so as to nullify the section 3(a) (11) exemption.
2. Residence of Offeree, Purchaser, and Issuer
The statutory language contemplates that all of the parties to an
intrastate transaction must be residents of the same state.
(a) Individual Person
Whether an individual be an offeree or purchaser, the Commission
has always interpreted residence as synonymous with domicile. The
statutory basis for this interpretation is well grounded in the require-
ment that the entire issue of securities be sold in a single state.3
Necessarily, the residence of the offeree or purchaser should be bona
fide. The SEC, or, where litigation is involved, a court, will look
through a device or subterfuge which may have been used to give the
appearance that the offeree or purchaser is a resident of the state. Thus,
the residence requirement has been held not to have been satisfied
33. See H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 16. See also SEC Securities Act Release
No. 1459 (May 29, 1937).
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where stock certificates were placed in the name of actual residents for
thirty days on the understanding that these persons later would transfer
the securities to non-residents; "' where securities were transferred to
a resident broker who later sold them to non-residents; 5 and where the
transfer was to a resident attorney representing non-residents3 6
However, it is not reasonable to assume that a person who pur-
chases securities in an intrastate offering will hold the securities forever.
Therefore, a purchaser, whether he himself remains a resident or be-
comes in good faith a non-resident, may, after a reasonable time, sell his
securities to a non-resident, and, in the absence of any inference of an in-
tent to evade the registration requirements of the act, the exemption
would not be lost by the issuer.3 7 Nor is an issuer in a position to insure
against a legitimate change of residence by a stockholder. Consequently,
such a change should not defeat the exemption-even though the pur-
chaser is buying securities on the basis of a periodic or installment
purchase plan. However, if the installments are to be paid over an
extended period of time or if the contract is assignable, the issuer as-
sumes a considerable risk that the exemption might be lost.
An obvious example of the residence problem arises with respect to
armed forces personnel."8 The Commission always has examined
very carefully the residence of military personnel who purchase secu-
rities sold under the intrastate exemption. Most frequently, service-
men temporarily assigned to a military installation have no intention
of becoming residents of the state in which the facility is located.
Since the Commission interprets residence in section 3(a)(11) as
requiring domiciliary intent it is most likely that in the average case
a sale to a serviceman would destroy the intrastate exemption, 39 unless
34. SEC v. Hillsborough Investment Corp., Civil No. 1965, D.N.H., Dec. 11, 1958.
35. Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957). The
device of selling all of an issue of securities to a resident broker who then resold to
non-residents was one of the first problems which confronted the Commission with
respect to the intrastate exemption. See Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C.
147 (1935) in which the Commission explains the reasons why it refused, on September
6, 1934, to register the bonds of the respondent on the New York Stock Exchange
because of the use of the above-mentioned device.
36. FTC Securities Act Release No. 97 (December 28, 1933), which was issued
by the Federal Trade Commission while it administered the Securities Act.
37. SEC Securities Act Release No. 1459 (May 29, 1937). The release contains
the cautionary language, however, that: "If the securities were resold but a short
time after their acquisition, this fact, although not conclusive, would strengthen the
inference that their original purchase had not been for investment, and that the
resale therefore constituted a part of a process of primary distribution; and a similar
inference would naturally be created if the seller were a security dealer rather than
a nonprofessional."
38. Unquestionably, servicemen are high on the list of those sought out by pur-
veyors of unregistered securities.
39. Although there is no immediately apparent connection between the Federal
Securities Act and the Pennsylvania Divorce Law, they have at least one thing in
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he was also, as a civilian, a resident of 'the state in which the securities
were to be sold. Unquestionably, a serviceman may adopt a new
"residence" in the domiciliary sense. However, there must be clear
proof of his intent to abandon his former domicile. Since the average
securities salesman has neither the time nor the inclination to investigate
these niceties, issuers who seek to rely on the intrastate exemption would
do well to avoid this possible legal pitfall. And it would appear that
the foregoing is equally applicable to foreign nationals who reside in a
state under a diplomatic or a temporary visitor's visa.
Residence problems may also arise in situations where non-
residents exercise options or warrants, pre-emptive rights, or rights as
to convertible securities. The ramifications of such problems are
manifold and whether the transaction would affect the intrastate ex-
emption would necessarily depend upon the facts of each individual
case. Consequently it is impossible to supply a rule of thumb which
will cover the varied factual situations which could occur in any one
or all of these situations. At the least, the issuer who is confronted
with any of these problems must recognize that the intrastate exemption
might be lost if care is not taken to assure that there is not in fact an
offer or sale to a non-resident.
In determining whether or not the exemption may be safeguarded
consideration must be given by the issuer to the following factors: (1)
the time at which the now non-resident purchaser obtained an equitable
interest in the security, (2) the possibility of obtaining a waiver by non-
resident shareholders of rights which they might have with respect to
the particular security, and, at all costs, (3) the absolute necessity of
abstaining from the use of devices to evade the restrictions contained
in the exemption. With respect to convertible securities and warrants,
it might well be argued that a purchaser obtains such an equitable
interest at the time of the original purchase of 'the security that the
later exercise of the right should not affect the exemption. On the
other hand, with respect to options and pre-emptive rights the sug-
gestion that an equitable interest had accrued to the purchaser appears
difficult to sustain. Clearly, an issuer, some of whose shareholders
have become non-residents but who nevertheless are entitled to pre-
emptive rights, cannot protect the exemption by arranging for a resident
of the state to exercise the pre-emptive rights pursuant to a power-of-
attorney given by non-resident shareholders. This would be evasion
common in that the jurisdiction and venue provision of the latter statute, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 16 (1955), uses the term "bon, fide resident" which has been inter-
preted to require domiciliary intent: Nixon v. Nixon, 329 Pa. 256, 198 Atl. 154 (1938);
McCauley v. McCauley, 184 Pa. Super. 361, 134 A2d 684 (1957).
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of the principles controlling the exemption. The better course is to
arrange, if possible, for a waiver of the pre-emptive right.
Conversely, inasmuch as the emphasis in the exemption is upon
the residence of the person having the beneficial interest in the security,
a direction by such person that the security be delivered and held for
him outside the state has no effect on the issuer's exemption.4
(b) Partnership
In either a general or limited partnership it is a real possibility that
some of the partners will not be residents of the same state as the issuer.
The question then presented is whether the partnership, as a business
entity, has a residence separate and distinct from its members. Since
a general partner retains his personal identity in a partnership, to a
degree, and has property rights with respect to the partnership property,
it would seem that non-residence of such a general partner would
seriously affect the issuer's intrastate exemption. On the other hand,
in view of the restricted rights of limited partners with respect to
partnership property and their interests in the entity, a stronger argu-
ment could be made that a purchase or sale by a limited partnership
having non-resident limited partners would not necessarily defeat the
exemption.
(c) Trustee and Executor
Transactions by either a trustee or an executor, whether in the
purchase or sale of securities, raise substantial problems for any issuer
who relies on the intrastate exemption. It appears clear that if a
trustee, who is a resident of a particular state, offers and sells trust
certificates in an irrevocable trust only to residents of that state, the
transactions would be exempt from registration under section 3 (a)
(11). However, aside from this specific situation, the application of
the law necessarily depends on the facts of the case involved, and no
generalization is warranted with respect to the availability or non-
availability of the exemption.
(d) Corporations
Whether a corporation is the purchaser or the seller of securities,
to preserve the intrastate exemption the corporation must make the
purchase or the sale, respectively, in the state wherein it is incorpo-
40. SEC Securities Act Release No. 1459 (May 29, 1937).
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rated.4' Further, if the corporation is the issuer of securities (i.e., the
seller) it must also "do business" within the state wherein the securities
are being sold.
It is common practice for a corporation to obtain its charter
in one state, although the principals, who are doing business in a
corporate form, intend to conduct the corporation's principal business
elsewhere than in the state of incorporation.' It is hardly consistent
with the language of the intrastate exemption that such a corporation,
which may be registered to do business in several states, could partici-
pate under section 3 (a) (11) as a resident purchaser of securities which
may be issued in several, or even one of the states in which the corpora-
tion is registered to do business. Although such a corporation may
subject itself to an action at law, the payment of taxes, and other legal
consequences in every state in which it registers to do business and, for
the purpose of venue statutes, be considered a resident of each such state,
nevertheless, such an interpretation of residence if applied with respect
to the intrastate exemption would be inconsistent with the language of
section 3 (a) (11) and its legislative history.
Multi-State Corporate Structure
If a corporate entity cannot cross state lines-register to do busi-
ness as a foreign corporation and offer or sell securities within that
state-without loss of the intrastate exemption, should it then be able
to do indirectly what it could not do directly? If a corporation were
to set up subsidiaries or affiliates in several states, planning to finance
the separate but related corporations through intrastate offerings in
each state, the Commission could be expected to see through and to
take a dim view of the plan. To preclude such multi-state corporate
arrangement would be a logical extension of the consistently recognized
interpretation of the exemption which has precluded a non-resident
controlling shareholder, whether an individual or a corporation, selling
control stock in the state of the issuer's incorporation.
41. It would seem that this principle follows from the plain language of § 3 (a)
(11). A recent case which might be interpreted to have misconceived the statutory
language in §3(a) (11) is Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F2d 269 (10th
Cir. 1957). This was a civil action between private parties under the Securities Act.
The SEC did not intervene or participate in the case amicus curiae. The issuer was
a Nevada corporation which had registered to do business in Utah. Corporate
securities were eventually distributed to residents of California through the device of
using a "conduit sale!' to a Utah broker. In the opinion there is a reference to
§ 3(a) (11) in discussion of the procedure used by the issuer in its attempt to
evade registration. The decision rests on an interpretation of "dealer's transactions"
exempt under § 4 of the Securities Act. On the facts of this case the corporate issuer
could not have availed itself of the intrastate exemption. To have complied with
§3(a) (11) the Nevada corporation could only have issued its securities in Nevada.
42. There is no securities law in Delaware, where so many corporations are
chartered which, in fact, never intend to do any business at all within the state.
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3. Doing Business
The requirement of "doing business" within the state is one which
rests upon the issuer of securities regardless of whether the issuer is
an individual, a corporation, or other type of business entity. A
realistic interpretation of the statute could hardly require that the
issuer do one hundred per cent of its business within the state in which
it desires to issue securities under section 3(a) (11). On the other
hand, the basic policy of the statute requires substantially more in the
way of "doing business" than has been held by the courts to be sufficient
for subjecting an individual or a business entity to service of process in
in civil litigation.'
It is impossible to say that any specified percentage of an issuer's
business, whether considered dollar-wise or by some other formula,
must be performed by the issuer in the state of residence. The Com-
mission's view over the years is that the issuer must conduct its principal
business within the state.
A recent case on this point is SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc."
The defendant was a California corporation which owned a wholesale
pharmaceutical business in San Francisco, the assets of which were less
than $13,000. It kept its books and records in California and all of its
officers and directors were residents of that State. It advertised for sale
in California 4,080 shares of stock at $1,000 per share. The proceeds
less sales commissions were to be used to acquire, refurbish and operate
the El Cortez Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. No sale of shares were
made. The court held that the offer was in violation of the registration
provisions of the act," and that under the factual circumstances of the
case the intrastate exemption was not available to the defendant.
In the Truckee Showboat case the contemplated principal business
of the issuer was outside the state of incorporation and for this reason
the exemption was unavailable. Equally significant is that the court
found a violation of the act even though only an offer had been made
and no sales of securities had occurred.
43. The leading case is International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 315-16 (1945). This case utilized the venue doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, the ultimate result of chipping away at the "mere solicitation" doctrine of
which Green v. Chicago B. & 0. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907), was the keystone. This
had occurred through a series of cases wherein "solicitation plus" was, in varying
factual situations, found to be sufficient to subject a non-resident to suit at law. The
basic notion in the transition was that the non-resident should have "certain minimum
contacts" with the forum so that suit there did not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
44. 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Calif. 1957).
45. In view of certain facts, including the termination of the option to purchase
the hotel, and undertakings by counsel for the issuer, the court found it unnecessary
to exercise its equitable power to issue a preliminary injunction.
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4. Offer and Sale
This particular aspect of the exemption more properly might have
been discussed earlier. However, the Truckee Showboat case in
particular points out that there need not be a sale for a violation of the
act to occur. An offer alone, under improper circumstances, may
constitute a violation.
With the many high powered communication facilities available
to an issuer 'from Main Street as well as one from Wall Street, care
must be taken, when making an intrastate offering of securities, to
limit the offering only to residents of the state in which the issue is
being sold. Since newspapers use the mails, as well as interstate
facilities, and since many, if not most, radio and television stations
have a multi-state coverage, even inadvertance in the use of such facili-
ties may destroy the exemption. At least in a newspaper announcement
the issuer should state unequivocally that offers to purchase are solicited
only from, and that sales of securities will be made only to, bona fide
residents of the particular state involved." Such restrictions should
also be woven into offerings by television and radio.
5. The Burden of Meeting the Conditions of the Exemption Is on
the Issuer
The Securities Act is a remedial statute, and "the terms of an
exception . . . must be 'strictly construed' against the claimant of
its benefits." '7 In view of the remedial nature of the act, it has been
held to be fair and reasonable to impose on an issuer, if he claims to
have acted pursuant to an exemption, the burden of proof that the
exemption in fact exists.48
In recognition of these burdens, some intrastate issuers have en-
deavored to protect themselves by obtaining a form of written assur-
ance from the purchaser that he is a bona fide resident of the state in
question. Similar assurances have been obtained by issuers in the form
of letters of "investment intent" in transactions involving the private
46. SEC Securities Act Release No. 1459 (May 29, 1937).
47. SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938). See
also: SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353, 355 (1943) ; Detroit
Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1941).
48. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953); SEC v. Sunbeam
Gold Mine Co., 95 F2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938). Cf. Schlemmer v. Buffalo R. & P. Ry.,
205 U.S. 1 (1907) ; Hartford Gas Co. v. SEC, 129 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Electric
Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 92 F2d 580 (2d Cir. 1937), aff'd, 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
Although these principles have been announced in cases involving exemptions
other than the intrastate exemption, there is no basis for distinguishing the applicable
rules. Consequently, in order to preserve the exemption from registration, the issuer
must channel his course most carefully through the varied pitfalls that confront him.
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offering exemption under section 4(1) of the act. The Commission
recently has informed the industry and the bar, in a public release fol-
lowing the Crowell-Collier investigation, that an issuer relies upon such
investment representations at his peril.49 The principles enunciated in
that release are likewise applicable to residence representations under
section 3 (a) (11).
It may also be considered whether an issuer who inadvertently
permits a few offers or sales to non-residents is thereafter precluded
from utilizing the exemption. Since such an exemptive provision is
to be strictly construed, it is the type of situation where the issuer may
not be "a little pregnant." Administratively, the Commission has
always taken the position that one sale to a non-resident destroys the
exemption. Although there is no federal court case in which the
Commission has sought injunctive relief where only one interstate
offer or sale has occurred, there has been one administrative proceeding
in which the Commission held that a single interstate sale nullified the
exemption under section 3 (a) (11) .ro
6. Effects of Failure To Meet the Exemption
If an issuer of securities intrastate fails to comply, for one reason
or another, with all of the conditions of the intrastate exemption,
it may be that the securities will have to be registered pursuant to
section 5 of the act. This will depend upon the dollar amount of
the securities issued. If that amount does not exceed $300,000 in any
one year, regulation A may be available; " its availability will present
interpretive problems, however, and each case, necessarily will depend
upon its own facts.
Where the conditions of the intrastate exemption have been
violated, the Commission may sue to restrain any further violation by
the issuer, 2 and it is no defense to claim that the out-of-state sales
49. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (August 12, 1957).
50. Professional Investors, Inc., 37 S.E.C. 173 (1956). The denial of registration
in this case was not predicated solely upon the violation of § 3(a) (11).
51. The Commission enacted regulation A which exempts securities meeting speci-
fied conditions from the registration provisions of the act, pursuant to its rule-making
power under § 3(b), 48 Stat. 76 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77c(b) (Supp. V
1958). The regulation is 17 C.F.R. 230.251 (1949). Legislation has been proposed
in the 86th Congress to increase the ceiling from $300,000 to $500,000. In fact a
bill was approved in the Senate in the 85th Congress but was not acted upon by the
House. Pending bills in the first session of the 86th Congress include: S. 1178; H.R.
4568; H.R. 2488; H.R. 5001. The Commission supports these proposals.
52. SEC v. Hillsborough Investment Corp., Civil No. 1965, D.N.H., Dec. 11, 1958;
SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., spra note 44; SEC v. Doctors Motels Inc., Civil
No. KC 907, D.C. Kan., Feb. 11, 1958; SEC v. Hunt, Civil No. 1480, W.D. Wash.,
Feb. 18, 1946.
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have terminated.5' Furthermore, if such activities persist after the
entry of an injunctive decree, the issuer may be charged with criminal
contempt 4
Registered broker-dealers who engage in purportedly intrastate
activities which result in a violation of the act are, of course, subject to
possible administrative sanction. 5 Or, an application for registration
as a broker-dealer may on account of such a violation, if coupled with
others, be denied5
RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
On February 27, 1958, the Honorable Abraham Multer introduced
in the House a bill W which would have eliminated the intrastate
exemption from the Securities Act."' The bill made no reference to
section 18 of the Securities Act which preserves state regulatory power
over securities transactions. Owing to the contemporaneous engage-
ment of the senior members of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce in more pressing matters before the Subcommittee
on Legislative Oversight, neither this nor any other legislative pro-
posals to amend the securities laws were considered by the Committee;
nor was Mr. Multer's proposal introduced in the Senate during the 85th
Congress. But as early as January 7, 1959, Mr. Multer reintroduced
his House proposal in the 86th Congress. 9 No similar proposal has yet
been introduced in the Senate.
On January 15, 1959, another bill to amend the Securities Act,
containing interesting features with respect to the intrastate and other
exemptions, was introduced in the House of Representatives." As it
53. SEC v. Doctors Motels Inc, supra note 52. This action was terminated later,
however, by stipulation upon the issuer's registration of its securities.
54. Paul John Hunt, Civil No. 1560, W.D. Wash., Aug. 12, 1946.
55. Cf. J. A. Hogle & Co., 36 S.E.C. 460 (1955). Here the Commission did not
impose a sanction for reasons stated in its opinion, although it found that no exemption
existed under § 3 (a) (11).
56. Professional Investors, Inc., 37 S.E.C. 173 (1956); Whitehall Corp., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5667 (April 2, 1958).
57. H.R. 11050, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
58. The bill provided: "That Section 3(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 is
amended by striking out the semicolon at the end of paragraph (10) and inserting a
period in lieu thereof, and by striking out paragraph (11) thereof."
For a short, but emphatic, statement by Congressman Multer in support of his
proposal, see 104 CoNG. Rxc. A-1858 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1958).
59. H.R. 884, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The proposal was not accompanied
by any supporting statement.
60. H.R. 2488, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The proposal, which also covered
other aspects of the Securities Act, originated with the Commission. It provides for
the shifting of certain so-called transaction exemptions from § 3(a) to §4 of the act.
The current §§3(a) (9), (10), and (11), frequently referred to as transaction exemp-
tions rather than securities exemptions, in fact properly belong in § 4. A similar
shift of these same exemptions was considered by the House of Representatives in
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relates to the intrastate exemption, the bill has two significant aspects.
First, in the proposed new section 4(a) (5), the intrastate exemption is
reworded as follows:
"Any offer or sale of a security which is part of an issue offered
and sold exclusively to persons resident within a single State or
Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person conducting
his principal business operations within such State or Territory
and resides in (or, if a corporation, is incorporated by) such State
or Territory." I1
Second, there would be a new section 4(b) which would empower the
Commission to "impose such terms and conditions . . . as may be
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors," with
respect to the intrastate exemption, the private offering exemption, and
certain other transaction exemptions.'
The rule-making power in the bill is of more far-reaching import
than the rewording of the statutory language of section 3(a) (11).
The latter would merely incorporate a well-established SEC interpreta-
tion into the act. The former would authorize the Commission to make
ground rules, not only for intrastate offerings, but for private placements
and certain exchanges of securities.' However, in view of the fact that
the Commission has now submitted proposals which have been intro-
duced in both houses of Congress and which omit this rule-making
power, it is doubtful that extensive consideration will be given by
Congress to the rule-making proposal.
64
1941, along with other amendatory proposals. Although extended conferences and
hearings took place the proposals were lost in the shuffle with the advent of World
War II, and were neither acted upon then nor submitted in the years which have
intervened. In the form in which the shift from one section to another was then
proposed the significance was merely "technical" See SECURITIS AND EXCHANGE
CommIssloN, 77TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT N PRoPosALs FOR A.mENDmENT OF THE
SECuRITIEs AcT oF 1933 AND THE SECURiTIES AcT or 1934 24 (Comm. Print 1941).
61. H.R. 2488, supra note 60. (Emphasis added.) The emphasized words are
the proposed changes. The proposal would substitute the word "exclusively" for the
word "only." The words "conducting his principal business operations," as substitutes
for the words "doing business," would merely codify the heretofore established Com-
mission interpretation of "doing business." Cf. SEC v. Truckee Showboat Inc., 157
F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Calif. 1957).
62. H.R. 2488, supra note 60.
63. It is interesting to note that the Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight recom-
mended that the private offering exemption should be conditioned upon either (1) an
opinion by the Commission or (2) a "no action" letter from the Commission. See
H.R. REP. No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1958).
64. S. 1178, H.R. 5001, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). These proposals also omit
the rewording of § 3(a) (11), as quoted above, and the proposed shift of exemptions
from §3 to §4.
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APPLICABILITY OF FRAUD AND CIVIL LIABILITY PROVISIONS OF
SECURITIES ACT TO INTRASTATE TRANSACTIONS
1. Fraud in Intrastate Transactions
Section 17 (c) of the Securities Act makes the anti-fraud provisions
of that statute applicable to securities offered and sold within a single
state."5 The provision is applicable, however, only if the issuer, in the
sale of securities, utilizes the requisite jurisdictional means, i.e., the
mails or any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce. The anti-fraud provisions of the statute are
set forth in section 17(a) thereof and include: (1) the employment
of any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) any misstatement of
a material fact or an omission to state a material fact necessary to be
stated under the circumstances, and (3) any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser."8  There are numerous decisions, both criminal and civil,
applying section 17(a) to particular factual situations.1 7  Under
65. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77q(c) (1952).
66. These anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act have been embodied in
rule 1OB-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5 (1949), enacted pursuant to the Exchange Act § 10,
48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78i (Supp. V, 1958). The effect of the
rule is to apply the anti-fraud provisions to purchases of securities as well as to sales.
It is hardly conceivable that an argument would ever be made to the effect that
§ 3(a) (11) affords any exemption with respect to this Exchange Act rule. Since the
intrastate exemption applies only to the registration provisions of the Securities Act it
can have no application to the Exchange Act. Also the factual situations in at least two
cases, where rule 10B-5 was applied, clearly demonstrate the implausibility of such
an argument. See Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theaters Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954
(N.D. Ill. 1952) which involved local business; and Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), 83 F. Supp.
613 (E.D. Pa. 1947), which involved the purchase of a corporation owned by four
individuals.
67. There have been many leading appellate cases in the fraud area. Examples
of some of the many criminal prosecutions for fraud under the Securities Act are:
United States v. Tellier, 255 F2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958) ;
United States v. Vasen, 222 F2d 3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955) ;
Nemec v. United States 178 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 985
(1950); Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 857 (1948); Mansfield v. United States, 155 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
329 U.S. 792 (1946); United States v. Monjar, 147 F2d 916 (3d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 859 (1945) ; Harper v. United States, 143 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1944) ;
Holmes v. United States, 134 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 776 (1943) ;
Gates v. United States, 122 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 698
(1942) ; Simons v. United States, 119 F.2d 539 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 616
(1941) ; Landay v. United States, 108 F2d 698 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
681 (1940); Kopald-Quinn & Co. v. United States, 101 F.2d 628 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 307 U.S. 628 (1939) ; Troutman v. United States, 100 F.2d 628 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 649 (1939); Bogy v. United $tates, 96 F.2d 734 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 608 (1938); Jarvis v. United States, 90 F.2d 243 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 705 (1937) ; Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 703 (1937).
Cases where the S.E.C. has succeeded in obtaining injunctions for violations of
§ 17(a) of the Securities Act include SEC v. Thomasson Panhandle Co., 145 F.2d
408 (10th Cir. 1944) ; Timetrust v. SEC, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Otis & Co. v.
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section 17(b) of the act the publication or circulation of certain types
of sales material for the preparation of which the issuer has paid a
consideration, is declared a fraudulent practice unless the payment of
such consideration is disclosed; " this provision, too, extends to issuers
and underwriters who sell securities under the intrastate exemption.
In view of the clear application of the section 17 anti-fraud provi-
sions to intrastate transactions, the section 3 (a) (11) exemption from
registration is not a license to omit disclosure of material facts which
under all the circumstances would have to be disclosed to purchasers
if the securities were being offered and sold interstate. An issuer who
decides to take advantage of the intrastate exemption assumes the risk
that he may violate the anti-fraud provisions of the statute. Thus, the
burden is on the issuer to safeguard against the omission of material
facts. If the Commission were to charge an issuer with a violation of
the anti-fraud provisions of the act, a subsequent registration of the
securities by the issuer would not eradicate the fraudulent misconduct.
Doubtless the Commission would press for injunctive relief against such
an issuer, even though, under all of the circumstances, it might deter-
mine not to refer the evidence for possible criminal prosecution.
Since under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure it is not neces-
sary to set forth in a complaint the underlying factual basis thereof, as
it is in those states which still adhere to a fact-pleading procedure, the
writer has been unable to determine precisely the number of injunctive
actions brought by the Commission for violations of the act's anti-
fraud provisions where securities were sold intrastate. From an ex-
tensive examination of some 225 legal actions which the Commission
instituted for violation of section 17(a) and 17(b), it appears that
substantially less than ten per cent of the actions brought under these
provisions involved intrastate transactions."0 It does not appear that
any intrastate fraud actions were instituted between 1940 and 1950.
However, the emphasis which the Commission has recently placed upon
enforcement litigation has brought an increase in the number of intra-
SEC, 106 F2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939); SEC v. Universal Service Ass'n, 106 F2d 232
(7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622 (1940).
Instances of violations of § 17(a) by broker-dealers were involved in: Norris &
Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Hughes v. SEC, 174
F2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 137 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944) ; Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943).
68. Professional Investors, Inc., 37 S.E.C. 173 (1956).
69. Since any statistical formula may tend to mislead, the writer desires to make
it abundantly clear that no conclusions safely can be drawn therefrom. No attempt
was made to compare, for example, the number of fraud cases where there had been
a prior registration of the security with the number where no registration statement
had been made effective. Neither does this review reflect the cases instituted for vio-
lation of the registration provisions of § 5.
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state fraud cases as well as in other types of fraud actions. Only one
of these cases, SEC v. Timetrust Inc.,," has been reported. The
remaining intrastate fraud cases resulted in the entry of unreported
consent decrees. 71
Typical of the cases in which the Commission has taken action to
enjoin intrastate sales which have been made in violation of section 17
is SEC v. Evergreen Memorial Park Ass'n.'2  In that case the associa-
tion had, upon previous Commission action, been enjoined from the
sale of investment contracts involving cemetery lots which had not been
registered with the Commission. The court's decree, entered upon
consent by the association,m required the association, inter alia, to sell
the investment lots for the individuals on a prescribed formula, to make
up substantial delinquencies in the perpetual care fund, and to keep
adequate and accurate books and records. While the Commission was
investigating the extent of compliance with this prior decree, Evergreen
gave notice to the Pennsylvania Securities Commission of its intention
to sell debt securities intrastate in the amount of $100,000. As a result
of advertising in various newspapers within the State of Pennsylvania
the association succeeded in disposing of the full amount. Following
this successful sale, Evergreen gave notice to the Pennsylvania Secu-
rities Commission that, pursuant to an exemptive provision of the
Pennsylvania statute, it intended to sell an additional $200,000 of
debentures intrastate. Prospective purchasers, as well as actual pur-
chasers, were given a brochure, titled an "offering circular," which
contained pictures of certain improved portions of the cemetery property
and, among other things, an appraisal of the cemetery showing its
value to be in excess of $8,700,000. Aside from such untrue statements
as appeared in the brochure or which were made orally in talking to
offerees, the principal violations were omissions to state certain ma-
terial facts in the brochure.74 Before any substantial amount of the
70. 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
71. SEC v. Evergreen Memorial Park Ass'n, Civil Nos. 24, 424, E.D. Pa., April
,11, 1958; SEC v. Adams Bond & Share, Inc., Civil No. 3413, D. Idaho, Feb. 13,
1958; SEC v. Insurance Corp. of America, Civil No. IP-56-C-152, S.D. Ind., June 13,
1957; SEC v. Mitchell Securities, Inc., Civil No. 8860, D. Md., May 16, 1956; SEC v.
Errion, Civil No. 7115, D. Ore., Nov. 20, 1953; SEC v. United Insurers Serv. Co.,
Civil No. 7219, W.D. Mo., Nov. 16, 1951; SEC v. Orler, Civil No. 725, D. Mass.,
Sept. 27, 1940; SEC v. Associated Pharmacists, Inc., Civil No. 2493, D. Md., April 26,
1937; SEC v. Bond & Share Co., Civil No. 5631, N.D. Ohio, Aug. 11 and Sept. 9,
1937; SEC v. Hickox Fin. Corp., Civil No. 5613, N.D. Ohio, June 24, 1937.
72. Supra note 71.
73. SEC v. Evergreen Memorial Park Ass'n, Civil No. 11821, E.D. Pa., 1953.
74. It omitted any significant financial information concerning the company; it
said nothing of the previous decree in the federal court and of its failure to comply
therewith; it failed to state that the delinquency in the perpetual care fund had
increased substantially; and it omitted to show that Evergreen had no active sales
force to sell the cemetery lots, or that it had an operating deficit in excess of $200,000.
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later block of debentures had been sold, the Commission brought a
second action. Being on notice of possible action by the Commission,
Evergreen endeavored to raise additional funds by giving personal notes
for amounts to be invested in the company. All of these activities were
the subject of the Commission's injunctive action.
After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain dismissal of the Commis-
sion's complaint, Evergreen agreed to the entry of a final injunctive
decree. As late as the actual hearing for preliminary injunction, how-
ever, it contended that if it had violated any statute it was the Penn-
sylvania act rather than the Federal Securities Act.75
This graphically depicts a misconception which is doubtlessly
widespread. The applicability of the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Act to intrastate sales, despite the intrastate exemption from
registration, is perhaps one of the most misunderstood facets of the act.
Although the Commission has not in fact, during the past twenty-five
years, brought an exceptionally high number of injunctive actions to
restrain intrastate issuers from violations of section 17, the Commis-
sion's more recent emphasis upon enforcement action makes it reason-
able to predict that a great many more injunctive actions will be brought
in section 3 (a) (11) cases in the years immediately ahead. In addition,
of course, there is also the possibility, if not the likelihood, that the
Commission will refer more and more intrastate fraud cases to the
Attorney General for criminal prosecution."6
2. Civil Liability
Similar misconception may exist with regard to the civil liability
provisions of the act. But under section 12(2) a person who offers or
sells a security, even though exempt from registration under section
75. Following the SEC action a receiver was appointed for Evergreen in the
Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia and, thereafter, the company was placed in
bankruptcy (E.D. Pa. Bankruptcy Cause No. 25731, pending). A report of the re-
ceiver shows liabilities in excess of $1,400,000 against the cemetery property (now
valued for other than cemetery purposes at $100,000) and other property and receivables
of $20,000. Evergreen's bank account contained $5.09.
76. Commission Litigation Releases which disclose recent criminal referrals in
intrastate fraud prosecutions are: Litigation Release No. 1414 (1959) (four defend-
ants); Litigation Release No. 1203 (1958) (two defendants); Litigation Release
No. 1152 (1957) (sevent defendants); Litigation Release No. 1151 (1957) (four
defendants) ; and Litigation Release No. 1128 (1957) (seven defendants). These
referrals cover twenty defendants. Since the Commission does issue a release until
an indictment has been returned, these releases do not cover intrastate fraud cases
which have been referred to the Justice Department but which have not yet been acted
upon. Further indication of the breadth of the Commission's activities with respect
to violations of the intrastate exemption is that Chairman Edward N. Gadsby an-
nounced to the Congress that in 1957 and 1958 the SEC opened 115 investigations
of offerings claimed to be exempt under § 3(a) (11). Statement Before a Subcom-
mittee on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce 15 (March 24, 1959).
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3(a) (11), may incur a civil liability to the purchaser.7  Conditions
precedent to the imposition of liability in connection with an offer or
sale are: (1) use of interstate facilities or of the mails, 78 (2) use of a
prospectus 79 or oral communication, (3) the making of an untrue
statement or the omission to state material facts thus rendering the
statements made misleading (either in the prospectus or oral com-
munication), and (4) absence of knowledge by the purchaser of the un-
truth or omission. As a defense under the act the person selling the
security has the burden of proving that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or
omission." The liability on the seller is not absolute; it is based upon
knowledge or, in the alternative, the failure to exercise due care.8"
STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
The securities industry is regulated internally on a voluntary basis
by the National Association of Securities Dealers.' External, in-
voluntary regulation is in the hands of the SEC (except for margin
requirements set by the Federal Reserve Board) '3 and the various
states. As a result, there is a myriad of rules and regulations applicable
to broker-dealers and to issuers of securities. However, even the com-
77. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (Supp. V, 1958). The liability is not
limited to the issuer. It extends to a broker who sells securities as an agent on behalf
of an issuer, Cady v. Murphy, 113 F2d 988 (1st Cir. 1940), and to an officer and
director who sells, Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir.
1957). It appears from the statutory language that any person who sells for an
issuer, regardless of his relationship, is within the orbit of potential liability.
78. Civil liability may be imposed even though the use of the mails has been
confined solely to one state: Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 39 F. Supp. 592
(E.D. Pa 1941); Gross v. Independence Shares Corp., 36 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa.
1941). The use of the jurisdictional means in any part of the transaction is sufficient.
It is not necessary that they be used in the communication of the untrue statement
or with respect to -the omissions. A delivery of the security or payment thereof by
mail will suffice: Creswell-Keith, Inc. v. Willingham, 264 F2d 76 (8th Cir. 1959);
Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 346 U.S. 908 (1953),
cert. disnissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); Schillner v. H. Vaughn Clarke & Co., 134
F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943); as will a delivery by an interstate railroad: Moore v.
Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
79. "Prospectus" is defined in § 2(10), 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§77b(10) (Supp. V, 1958). It is not limited to the formal, bulky document filed with
the Commission; it includes letters, circulars and advertisements which appear in news-
papers and on radio and television. Communications not deemed to be a prospectus
are covered in Commission rule 134, 17 C.F.R. 230.134 (Supp. 1958).
80. The basis for shifting the burden to the seller is based upon the congressional
opinion that the seller is in the best position to know of any flaw in the selling
statements. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 16, at 23. The common-law burden of
reasonable care is shifted from the buyer to the seller. Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp.
466 (S.D. Me. 1939), aff'd, Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1940).
81. Petersen Engine Co., 2 S.E.C. 893 (1937).
82. The Association (hereinafter referred to as the N.A.S.D.) exists pursuant
to the Meloney Act § 15A amendment to the Securities Exchange Act, 52 Stat. 1070
(1938), 15 U.S.C. §78o-3 (1952).
83. Exchange Act §7, 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78g (1952).
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bined efforts over the past two-and-one-half decades of all of these
regulatory bodies have not effectuated an eradication of fraudulent or
other undesirable practices which result in the loss every year of many
millions of dollars by the investing public.
Among the serious and usually complicated enforcement problems
confronting the several securities regulatory bodies are: (1) the
"boiler rooms," which usually sell securities through fraudulent and
deceptive high pressure methods by use of the long-distance telephone;
(2) the corporate "empire builders," who, through mergers, proxy
raids, acquisitions of subsidiaries and the like, create fictitious market
values in the securities of the company involved; (3) the manipulators,
who put "packages" together for others, supply needed capital or
sources of capital, jiggle the prices of stocks, proffer investment advice
(all for a consideration, usually stock), and who, when the bubble
bursts, probably make a secondary profit either by foreseeing the end
or by setting the date for it, having sold "short" at the right time; (4)
the plain, ordinary "con men," who live by their wits, the gullibility of
the public, and the "get-rich-quick" aspirations of the average public
investor; and (5) the bumbling optimists, who are so bent upon putting
through "their deal" (always convinced that they have finally found
the "better mousetrap") that they ignore the plain requirements of the
law as to fraud. Most public investors who purchase securities which
have been offered for sale through the hands of any of these persons are
apt to suffer substantial financial losses.
The activities of boiler rooms, corporate empire builders and
manipulators are not usually confined to a single state. Therefore,
effective enforcement against them depends upon the Commission, the
national securities exchanges, or the N.A.S.D. On the other hand,
state authorities, in addition, can be effective in enforcing the law
against con men and fraudulent promoters. It is these latter two types
of activity which can and do flourish within the boundaries of a single
state.
The only really effective method of handling these enforcement
problems, either by the states or the federal government, is through
criminal prosecution. Civil action, by way of a court injunction, may
stop a particular aspect of one of these problems, but an injunction,
which has only latent punitive effects, is not an effective deterrent.
Further, since the disclosure provisions of the Securities Act are di-
rected primarily to new issues of securities those provisions are not a
satisfactory answer to the serious enforcement problems set forth above.
In those states in which the state commission or the administrator
exercises a power to prohibit the sale of certain new issues of securities
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or to impose conditions thereon, investors have at least a greater
measure of protection than investors in other states.8 4 However, this
paternalistic "spoon-feeding" of public investors does not begin to cope
with the major enforcement problems.
Today, state securities regulation follows no uniform pattern.
AQ;drP frnm thp Fnri- flint nm-4hpr ITNTvirn nnr Tnpilnwnrn hn nv "hlii-
sky" law at all, the remaining state statutes are an almost hopeless
hodge-podge. Some have only fraud statutes, others register or qualify
securities, while still others register or license persons engaged in
securities transactions. Mostly, the states have combined two or more
of these. In any event, however, regardless of the particular pattern
adopted, there are as many variances in statutory language, section by
section, as there are state laws. 5  To this situation which is so desper-
ately in need of correction, there are two possible solutions. One would
be the adoption of a uniform statute. The other, the route of Repre-
sentative Multer's proposal, 6 is that the federal government pre-empt
the field.
Because of the varying philosophies of the existing state securities
laws, a project to recommend one integrated uniform act was abandoned
in favor of a proposed uniform act containing provisions in four sepa-
rable areas: i.e., (1) anti-fraud, (2) registration of broker-dealers,
salesmen and investment advisers, (3) registration of securities, and
(4) general provisions to implement the first three. This permits a
state to adopt one or more of the severable portions of the act. To
date the uniform act has received only modest acceptance, despite the
widespread approval which has been accorded to it by industry, the
bar and the North American Securities Administrators.87
The second alternative, that the federal government pre-empt the
field, is based upon the premise that uniform state laws are not an
adequate solution because in this area the states no longer perform an
84. There is a sharp difference in theoretical approach between the full disclosure
provisions of the Securities Act and these particular state statutes. When one con-
siders (1) the impact of these state laws on the economy of the country and the
capital markets in general, (2) the great power which they vest in, and which may
be exercised at the whim of, the state authority, and (3) the lack of uniformity which
necessarily results from such ad 1wc administration-and weigh these against the
investor protections which result-it appears that on balance the disclosure theory,
if supported by aggressive anti-fraud enforcement, is more sound.
85. Loss & Cowarr, BLUE Sxy LAw (1958), is a comprehensive study of the field.
86. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
87. For text and coment on the Uniform Securities Act see Loss & Cow=TT,
BLUE Sn- LAw 245-420 (1958). This text also sets forth a summary of the
developments leading up to the adoption of the final draft, and a report showing
what actions certain states have taken with respect to the act. Loss & CowErr, op. cit.
supra 233-36.
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important social or economic function.8  It goes without saying that
for numerous, varied reasons there are many who controvert this posi-
tion. There are literally thousands of securities offerings made every
year by issuers who distribute them exclusively intrastate. Some may
involve large amounts of money, but the very great majority of such
intrastate distributions probably involve less than $100,000. Thus, to
effect federal pre-emption by elimination of the intrastate exemption of
section 3(a) (11) would inject the Commission into the financing of
every -small business in the country. It might be argued that offerings
under a certain amount, e.g., $100,000, could be excluded. This is not
really a sound logical alternative, however, because there is just as
much need for disclosure in a $50,000 offering as there is in one of
$150,000.
In the author's view, the original congressional policy of reserving
to the states jurisdiction over the securities industry is as sound today as
it was twenty-five years ago. There is much to be said for the
proposition that the local financing of local business should be super-
vised by local authority. If this policy were supported in the states
by the adoption of the Uniform Securities Act, many of the current
difficulties would be eased, if not eliminated. The registration provi-
sions of the uniform act would require necessary disclosures not pres-
ently being made in many states. But adequate regulation will not
result unless the states adopt the entire uniform act. The securities
industry and bar would do well to continue to urge that view. Of
course, the states must make necessary budgetary allowances to support
the enforcement of the law.
There is another area of regulation where the states, rather than
the federal government, are probably best able to do the job and that
is in the registration and control of securities salesmen. The Com-
mission does not have statutory authority to register salesmen; the
statutory power covers only broker-dealers.8 " Aside from that, this
88. Armstrong, Commet-Thw Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REv. 713 (1958). It
is impossible to summarize here the many arguments stated in support of the position
taken by Mr. Armstrong. It is believed, however, that the following two statements
are representative of why he favors federal pre-emption. "This tremendous, sensitive,
complex mechanism of the corporate securities markets is extremely important to
our national economy. It is this national, as opposed to local or single-state economy,
which should concern us." Id. at 717. "Thus the states, exercising their sovereign
police power in an economic area of interstate significance, have distorted their origi-
nal purpose to protect their citizens against fraud. Instead they have set up a protective
machinery, often based on local interests, which is completely antithetical to the public
interest in free and open corporate securities markets. The Uniform Act does not
appear to offer a solution to this." Id. at 718.
89. Exchange Act § 15(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78o
(1952). See SEC v. Wallach, 202 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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type of regulation appears to be one which can be best handled locally
by state authorities.
CONCLUSION
With both state and federal laws applicable in certain respects to
intrastate offerings and sales of securities, issuers and their counsel
must take notice that:
1. In every state the anti-fraud and civil liability provisions of the
federal law apply;
2. In states which themselves have statutes with anti-fraud pro-
visions, an issuer or other seller of securities may, by his misconduct,
subject himself to both state and federal criminal or civil sanctions; and
3. In many intrastate offerings of securities difficult interpretive
problems may arise as a result of which the intrastate exemption may
be nullified and registration of the securities under federal law may
become necessary.
In short, the intrastate exemption is a limited one; much more so than
most issuers realize. The exemption rests upon the foundation laid in
section 18 of the act wherein Congress preserved the jurisdiction of
the states over transactions in securities. The legislative history of the
Securities Act clearly outlines the respective roles of the federal and
state securities authorities in regulating traffic in this intricate mer-
chandise. It is most unfortunate that in the past quarter-century the
states, which were the pioneers in this regulatory field, have not demon-
strated the foresight and aggressive leadership which marked their
early efforts to protect public investors.
Today, state authorities generally have neither adequate statutory
tools with which to work nor sufficient budgetary allowances to employ
the staff personnel necessary to do the interpretive, regulatory, and
enforcing jobs which must be done. As a result of the appalling lack
of uniformity among the laws of the various states, legitimate busi-
nesses are confronted by unnecessary and costly barriers to their public
financing. For the same reason purveyors of worthless or questionable
securities may pick and choose the states on which they will descend to
take unfair advantage of a gullible and unsuspecting public. It is no
answer figuratively to collect all intrastate securities offerings in one
bundle and to deposit them on the doorstep of the SEC. The real
answer lies in a revival of the vigorous leadership which the states
originally demonstrated in this field. Strong state legislation, properly
and adequately administered, and, at the same time, supplemental fed-
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eral legislation is the same prescription which Congress wrote out
twenty-five years ago. Already the biggest part of the job has been
done for the states. The Uniform Securities Act has been drafted; it
is an excellent working tool. It need only be adopted. Were all states
to adopt the complete uniform act and to supplement it with adequate
budgets, each state would be doing its share by protecting its propor-
tion of our eight million public investors. In the past five years the
program has been accorded a full measure of lip-service. On its merits
it is entitled to more-from industry, the organized bar, the financial
community and the securities authorities themselves.
